Tritax Symmetry (Hinckley) Limited

HINCKLEY NATIONAL RAIL FREIGHT INTERCHANGE

The Hinckley National Rail Freight Interchange Development Consent Order

Project reference TR050007

Applicant's response to Deadline 5 Submissions [part 7 - Action Groups]

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Planning Act 2008

The Infrastructure Planning (Applications: Prescribed Forms and Procedure) Regulations 2009 Regulation 5(2)(q)

Matter	Applicant's Response
Intended submission (not read out) to ISH6 on January 24th 2024, relating to Agenda item 4 **Dave Harrold (Chairman, Stoney Stanton Action Group)** The Stoney Stanton Action group is not convinced that the problem of trains slowing down to enter the rail freight terminal, and also gradually speeding up as they exit the rail terminal, has been adequately accounted for. This issue was raised in the Stoney Stanton Action Group Written Representation document TR050007-001388 subsections 4.1.8 and 4.1.9. Specifically, we do not believe that the applicant has shown that the proposed rail freight terminal can accommodate 16 freight trains per day entering and leaving the site when interleaved with existing traffic. The applicant's Rail Operations Report (TR050007-001893-6.2.3.1A HNRFI ES Appendix 3.1 Rail Operations Report) refers to speeds of 15mph within the rail port and a safe and appropriate speed of 25mph for entry to the railport, however these are likely to be maximum speeds, not the actual operational speeds. As the railport is designed for speeds of 15mph, then it is likely that the entry speed will be no more than 15mph. Also, trains are slowing to a halt, therefore the average entry speed of a 775m long train is likely to be considerably less than 15mph. If the average speed is about 7.5mph for instance, then the entry time may be 4 to 5 minutes. For trains leaving the railport, times are likely to be longer as the train will be slowly accelerating. We could not see a quantitative assessment of this, just a subjective comment in	Operational Modelling was undertaken using the established industry software called Railsys, which was reviewed and accepted by Network Rail. The modelling assumed a 'worst case' scenario of the trains slowing down to no more than walking pace on the mainline before the signal clears into the terminal. The train would then accelerate into the terminal but is unlikely to reach 15 mph as stated in the response – however this is all accounted for in the model. In addition, as soon as the mainline is cleared, then the route can be set for the main line, which will be before the train has come to a stand in the terminal itself. The modelling is based upon the maximum 775m length freight train. Trains are unable to begin accelerating until the rear of the train has cleared the speed restriction. Running times from Hinckley station to the terminal are around 7 minutes and from Croft to the terminal around 8 minutes (this applies in both directions) – noting when departing the train is not constrained by approach control signalling. As stated in the operations report, in terms of conflicts with other trains, the timetable planning rules assumed recommended that no other train could pass either Hinckley or Croft (the nearest signal section and timing point) until a conflicting move at the terminal has been completed. This was accepted by Network Rail and therefore the actual required gap between traffic is therefore less than the 15 minutes assumed in the query. Network Rail has sets out in its draft Rail Report submitted at Deadline 4, at Section 9, its Network Capacity Analysis which concludes it is satisfied that

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section 4.5 of the Rail Operations Report based on a statement that 25mph is safe and appropriate. Assuming at least a 5 minute gap between trains for safety, then there will be something like a 15 minute or more obstruction on the Westbound track for Westbound trains entering or leaving the terminal, and potentially 15 minutes or more on Westbound and Eastbound tracks for Eastbound trains entering or leaving. Taking this into account, it seems to us that this would cause problems for the existing level of combined rail freight and passenger traffic, and certainly would not be compatible with any increase in passenger services which have been talked about in the press. **For reference:** Taken from Stoney Stanton Action Group WR document TR050007-001388 items 4.1.8 and 4.1.9 4. Rail Traffic 4.1.8 The most difficult obstacle will be trains requiring access or egress from the HNFRI site. Eastbound trains will almost certainly be slowed to a stand or 5-10mph before entering the site. That access will then require a prolonged obstruction of both eastbound and westbound lines until the train is fully clear of the main running lines. Egress will require similar line obstruction and a similar delay whilst the train accelerates to its line speed.	sufficient network capacity exists in the WTT to support the level of traffic to/from HNRFI in both the east and west bound directions. (document reference: REP4-192). The final version submitted at Deadline 5 does not vary this conclusion. See Deadline 5 Submission - Supplemental Rail Report. As referenced in 9.1.11 ii) of the report, this analysis included allowing for any known service development aspirations. In this case, this relates to the additional express passenger service at 1 train per hour each way, being promoted by Midland Connect. The Business Case for this is currently being developed, so is still an aspiration, but HNRFI would not prevent it coming into service.

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4.1.9 The same problems will affect westbound trains, which will not obstruct the eastbound line, however restarting a 1,500-tonne train on a 1 in 162 gradient, particularly in adverse rail conditions, will require extended signalling section occupation. This will cause considerable problems on a line which is as restricted and busy as the Wigston <> Nuneaton line is.	